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transition to crisis
Denis Fischbacher-Smith
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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the notion of effectiveness in the context of
organisational crisis. It considers the “darker” side of organisational effectiveness by exploring the
processes by which effectiveness can be eroded as an organisation moves from an ordered
state, through a complex one, and into a state of chaos, or crisis. It brings together complementary
literatures on risk, crisis management, and complexity, and uses those lenses to frame some of the
key processes that allow organisations to transition to a state that shapes their inabilities to
remain effective.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper sets out a theoretical framework for the analysis
of a crisis event and does so in a way that emphasises the role of the human element in the various
stages of a crisis: the incubation phase, the operational crisis, and the post-event legitimation
phase. The paper uses the emerging crisis around the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines flight
MH370 to illustrate some of the task demands associated with a crisis and the manner in which
crisis events challenge the efficiencies and capabilities of organisations to deal with complex,
multi-layered issues in which uncertainty is high. Given the emergent nature of that particular
crisis, the use of the case is purely illustrative rather than analytically grounded in a normal case
study approach.
Findings – The paper highlights a number of underlying elements that contribute to the generation of
crises and offers recommendations for managers on how to deal with those demands. The paper shows
how an organisation can move from an ordered state into a complex or chaotic one and highlights
some of the problems that arise when an organisation does not have the capabilities to respond to the
task demands generated by such a shift in the environment.
Practical implications – The paper challenges some of the normal practices of management in
a “steady state” environment and highlights the need to consider the organisational capabilities that
are necessary to deal with the transition from a stable to an unstable system state and ensure
organisational effectiveness in the process. A core message within the paper is that the “normal”
processes of management can contribute to the generation of crises as organisations prioritise
short-term efficiencies over the strategies for longer-term effectiveness. The implications for crisis
management practices are discussed.
Social implications – The paper considers an issue that has wider applicability within society
namely the relationships between organisational effectiveness and risk. The issues raised in the paper
have applicability in a range of other societal settings.
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Originality/value – The key output from the paper is the development of a theoretical framework
that allows for an analysis of the relationships between crises and organisational effectiveness. The
paper argues that effectiveness and crisis management are intrinsically linked and that crises occur
when organisational effectiveness is impaired. The paper highlights the role that template-based
approaches to dealing with complex problems can have in terms of the generation of crisis events.
Keywords Organizational effectiveness, Risk management, Human error, Organization crisis
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
There’s an argument that the further you are from risk, the less aware of it you become.
We are very aware, so we don’t half keep an eye out for it (Bonhomme, 2014, p. 110).
The opening comment, made by a serving British Airways pilot, raises an important
issue in terms of the ways in which risk (and, ultimately, a crisis) is managed within
complex, socio-technical systems. Those who manage the performance of the system
and who also bear the costs associated with its failure, are invariably acutely aware
of the implications of any erosion in organisational effectiveness at multiple points
in space and time. Aviation is a particularly interesting example of this process as it is
often seen as a highly effective and safety conscious sector but one that clearly has
the potential for failure. It places human operators in direct contact with complex
technologies and does so in an environment where failure of critical systems can have
dire consequences. Whilst failures are often attributed to errors on the flight deck
there is mounting empirical evidence that supports the role of latent conditions in
generating those errors (Harris and Li, 2010; Li and Harris, 2006; Li et al., 2008), thereby
highlighting the wider issues of organisational effectiveness in the “incubation” of a
crisis (Turner, 1976, 1978, 1994).
When a commercial aircraft does crash, and especially one from the more
prestigious airlines, there is often a heightened level of interest in the nature of
the failure – with questions being asked as to how a well-managed company can
experience such a catastrophic event? All too often, the focus is on the potential for
pilot error as a root cause of the event. However, this is something of a flawed notion
as it invariably focuses on active errors by the human operators, rather than
considering the wider issues of latent factors in the generation of the event.
The assumption can be challenged, however, by the numerous examples of failure
that have complacency and the perceptual minimisation of risk at their core (Reason,
1990, 1997; Trivers, 2013). Where the causal factors are unknown or ambiguous, or
where there is seen to be the potential for common-mode failures (i.e. with a fault in
the technology itself) then there is often the potential for the event to be seen as
presenting a set of generic risks, and is, therefore, one that can effect other
organisations in the same industry. The discussion of such wider vulnerabilities has
the potential to escalate a catastrophic accident and organisational crisis into a much
wider event.
The effectiveness of any aircraft in flight is a function of the performance of the
pilots, the core technologies in use, air traffic control, weather systems, ground-based
maintenance, organisational and security processes, and a range of other activities
across airports, aircraft supply chains, and a number of monitoring organisations
that provide in-flight data management (de Carvalho, 2011; English and Branaghan,
2012; Kontogiannis and Malakis, 2012; McCarthy, 1989; Shappell et al., 2007).
Failures within a broad range of activities across the system could potentially have
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an adverse impact on effectiveness that could ultimately (however unlikely) impact
upon the effectiveness of an aircraft in flight. There is, therefore, often a separation
between those who deal with the day-to-day management of risk at the sharp end
from those who design, manage, and support the system at a more strategic level.
The assumption is often made that those who deal with the sharp end of the
system are thought to be sufficiently trained and skilled in dealing with the potential
that exists for any movement away from the system’s “designed-for” state.
However, emergent conditions arising from the interactions between systems
components can serve to move it away from its designed-for state into one that is
potentially unstable. In addition, the various contexts within which individuals and
teams function at the operational core of the wider system are shaped by the
decisions and actions taken at more strategic levels and which give rise to the
creation of “error traps” or “latent conditions” (Reason, 1990, 1997). Put another way,
those who design and manage the system have the potential to generate conditions
that impact on the effectiveness of those who work at the operating core of the
organisation. As a consequence, the achievement and maintenance of effectiveness
within a system is not likely to be uniform across space and time. The result is the
creation of a set of fractures within controls that allows an organisation to incubate
the potential for failure as a consequence of these fault lines (Reason, 1990, 1997;
Turner, 1978, 1994).
The aim in this paper is to consider the nature of the relationships between
effectiveness and crisis and to frame the conceptualisation of their interactions within
the context of rapidly changing environmental shifts. More specifically, the paper
conceptualises the notion of ineffectiveness as an underlying driver for crisis and it
frames and contextualises it as part of the “incubation process” around failure
(Turner, 1978, 1994). Of particular concern here is the attempt to address the notion
of crisis through a multi-disciplinary lens and, in so doing, to highlight some of
the broader implications for people management. In particular, the role of human
resources function can be seen as an essential element of the processes around
prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery. In each of those phases, people
management is an essential component of the effectiveness of the organisation
through such issues as dealing with insider threats, the reduction of human error
(both latent and active), the development of crisis management teams, the impact of
stress within a crisis on organisational performance, and the challenges around the
survivor syndrome. Each of these issues represents areas of research that would
warrant further attention within this journal.
The approach taken here is framed by work on systems thinking, (Ashby, 1958;
Boisot and Child, 1999; Fortune and Peters, 1995) and notably by the processes
around soft systems methodologies (Checkland, 1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1990)
as a means of shaping the dynamics of these complex, multi-layered relationships.
The paper uses the first 100 days following the disappearance of Malaysia
Airlines MH370 as a means of illustrating some of the issues associated with the
move from effectiveness towards crisis. Given the emergent nature of that particular
case, our discussions here will be limited to the period covered by the first 100 days
of the crisis and the analysis of the issues will inevitably be partial as the cause
of the disappearance remains at unknown at the time of writing. The paper will not
deal with the subsequent loss of the second Malaysia Airlines plane MH17, that was
shot down over Ukraine on the 17 July 2014 with the loss of all 283 passengers
and 15 crew members. Whilst that tragedy raises a further set of issues around
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organisational effectiveness – especially in terms of the decision making process for
flying over conflict zones – it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider both cases
simultaneously. There are undoubtedly issues that will emerge from both events that
have implications for the relationships between organisational effectiveness and
crisis. This will be especially the case as information around both events is made
available through the investigations’ processes. Similarly, the impact of the tragedies
on the performance of Malaysia Airlines will also be an issue that unfolds over time
and early indications point to the negative impact of the two events on the company’s
share performance (Topham, 2014; West, 2014). Before examining elements of the
MH370 case, it is first necessary to consider the relationships between effectiveness
and crisis in more detail and to set out a theoretical framework within which to
conceptualise this relationship.
The nature of crisis
The notion of organisational effectiveness is invariably affected by the generation
of these fault-lines within and between organisations. The manner in which an
organisation can transition from an effective state to one of crisis is a function of a
range of interactions at various levels of the organisation and across its supply
chains. Thus, at any point in time and space an organisation will only be as effective
as its most critical elements allow and its performance will invariably be perceived
differently by those who interact with it across the range of its activities.
Effectiveness is, therefore, essentially defined across space and time. It exists
differentially across this organisational space, and it will be “defined” by those who
interact with it across the range of organisational activities. Thus, effectiveness can
be both “real” and perceived at different points in space, place, and time thereby
making the determination of effectiveness by management somewhat problematic
and ephemeral.
A crisis is also a state that is invariably “defined” by those who witness it – as such,
it is also open to multiple interpretations. Most people would consider an organisation
in the middle of a crisis event as being one that is not effective. It is, after all, in
a situation that it is finding difficult to control and manage. However, the state
of “being in a crisis” is one part of the spectrum of processes within crisis management
and there are other, less visible, process that lead up to that point. This paper argues
that a crisis occurs across three interconnected stages – a crisis of management
(that allows the potential crisis conditions to develop), an operational stage (where the
organisation is seeking to contain the high-energy situation that is causing harm), and
the crisis of legitimation (the period after the event where the organisation seeks to
recover its reputation and to learn lessons from the experience) (Smith, 1990, 2006b).
There has been some criticism of those who see the crisis process as operating simply
in a response mode and who fail to see the importance of the precursor and
legitimation/learning conditions to the “operational” stage of the event (Smith, 1990,
1995, 2006a). Effective crisis management also considers the processes of turnaround
and organisational learning as an integral part of the process (Smith and Elliott, 2007;
Smith and Sipika, 1993). These three stages of crisis are also set against shifts in the
environment as the organisation moves from an ordered, through complex, to chaotic
systems state. These systems states are drawn from research in systems biology
as a means of explaining how organisms develop the “fitness” to cope with the task
demands generated by their environmental settings (Kauffman, 1993; Kauffman
and Johnsen, 1991).
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The notion of a crisis is, therefore, one of a complex, multi-level phenomenon. It is
one that needs to be contextualised in the spatial and temporal setting in which it
occurs if we are to make sense of the factors that led to its occurrence and the ways in
which it was managed. Within each of the phases of a crisis, and at particular points in
space and time, an organisation may function in an effective manner; whereas, in other
settings, its lack of effectiveness in one part of its operations, may serve to
trigger adverse conditions that escalate to crisis. It may be, for example, that the
organisation had an effective set of crisis management capabilities but it has poor
horizon scanning skills and was therefore unable to foresee a rapid shift in the
environment that overcame its capabilities to respond. It may also be the case that
the scale of these environmental shifts was so great that it created emergent
conditions that, despite having well-developed crisis response plans, made those
plans inadequate or dysfunctional. The organisation could also be in a state of crisis
because the event was triggered by the intentional acts of a third party – a hostile
attack, for example, that systematically sought to by pass the controls that were
in place to protect the organisation – although this would also raise questions
about the effectiveness of the organisation’s security processes. Of course, none
of these factors may apply and the organisation may simply be one that is crisis
prone as a function of its poor managerial practices (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992;
Turner, 1994). What is obvious is that the notion of “being in crisis” can take multiple
forms and can arise from multiple triggering events and as a result crisis
management, and its relationships with organisational effectiveness, is a complex,
multi-level issue.
At this point we need to provide a definition of crisis that serves as a means of
entering into a wider discussion around the multi-layered nature of the term and its
associated processes. For our present purposes, a crisis is defined here as:
A complex, multi-level event that exceeds, or comes close to exceeding, the capabilities of the
organisation to respond to the task demands that face it and without the need for significant
additional (often external) resources being brought to bear. It provides a fundamental
challenge to the effectiveness of an organisation in terms of its abilities to prevent, mitigate, or
respond to these task demands and processes.
This definition highlights both the internal and external dynamics of crisis and
frames it within the notion of organisational (dynamic) capabilities and resources
(both human and material). Implicit within this definition is the importance of the
organisation’s environment and its changing dynamics in shaping the particular
nature of a crisis. Thus, a crisis can be seen as being predicated on the symbiotic
relationships that exist between demand and response, where these relationships
often play out over time and across space, and where effectiveness sits at the core
of the process.
Contextualising crisis and organisational effectiveness: two sides of the
same coin?
Given the impact of crises on organizational reputation, legitimacy, and ability to execute
organizational goals, crisis management has risen in prominence as an organizational
function (Fediuk et al., 2010, p. 221).
The notion of a crisis is something of a contested term. In common usage, the term is
often used to describe events that are traumatic, but which fall short of the pervasive
nature of failure that is associated with a crisis. In some cases – the NHS being an often
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quoted example – commentators claim that an organisation is in a constant state of
crisis. This tends to underestimate the significance of the term, as a crisis should
describe events that, unless mitigated, will provide a significant challenge to the
continued existence of the organisation or severely damage its reputation (Smith, 1995).
Organisations that are perceived to be constantly “in crisis” are invariably operating in
a chaotic systems state and are constantly readjusting their actions and activities in an
attempt to deal with the task demands of the event. Perhaps a better way of describing
such organisations is that that they consistently display the potential for crisis but
may well have adapted to satisfice on the edge of a crisis state. In an organisational
setting, the term “crisis” should be used to describe events that push the organisation
to the limits of its capabilities – in other words, a crisis should challenge the
organisation’s abilities to cope with the task demands of the event within its existing
resource and capability structures and without additional damage occurring. Such
damage can be physical, economic, or reputational and may be immediate or delayed
in terms of its effects. A crisis, therefore, has the potential to unfold over space and
time to cause harm to organisations and it can be seen as being either acute or
chronic in the manner in which it escalates. At its core, a crisis challenges
the abilities of an organisation to be effective in terms of being able to prevent the
damaging event from occurring, mitigating and responding to its consequences once
it does occur, and recovering from the adverse consequences that it generates.
These four processes – prevention, mitigation, response, and recovery – are key
elements of organisational performance against which effectiveness, in terms of
crisis management, will invariably be judged. Each of these processes can be seen to
generate task demands around organisational capabilities, especially in terms of the
development of routines and protocols, which help identify and mitigate early
warnings of crisis. Whilst an argument can be made that these should be seen as core
attributes of management (Smith, 1995, 2005), they are often subjugated in the search
for efficiencies.
The academic literature on risk and crisis management[1] has maintained a focus on
the evolutionary and adaptive nature of crisis and has provided an on-going critique
of the command and control models of management. The interaction between an
organisation and its environment, along with the internal changes and adaptations
that occur, create the potential for emergent conditions that move an organisation away
from its designed for state and begins to erode its effectiveness as a consequence.
An additional element of interest here relates to the manner in which the organisation’s
environment can change and the responses made to those shifts will also determine
how effective the organisation is in adapting to the new task demands. The further the
organisation is moved away from its “normal” operating conditions, the greater
the chance that will spiral into a state of crisis. Any vulnerabilities within an
organisation’s control systems will invariably impair its effectiveness when it is moved
out of its designed for state.
Our awareness and understanding of the threats that we face are key elements
in shaping the ways that we respond to those threats and there is a large body of work
that deals with the range of barriers that seem to inhibit that understanding (see e.g.
Elliott and Smith, 2006; Elliott et al., 2000; Smith and Elliott, 2007). Our levels of
awareness are important elements within the processes of threat recognition and the
subsequent development of mitigation and response strategies used to deal with those
threats. To achieve effectiveness, organisations need to ensure that early warnings
of potential failure are dealt with in an appropriate manner. Effective threat recognition
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is, however, often inhibited by paradigm blindness, where decision makers deny the
plausibility of particular threats and fail to develop appropriate mitigation strategies
as a consequence (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). If this results in a lack of recognition of
the significance of early warnings around a particular threat, then there is no impetus
for managers to develop a greater understanding of the nature of the phenomena –
organisations therefore become blind to the risk (in terms of both its probabilistic and
consequential components) because it does not fit their world view and it is therefore
dismissed as not being credible. This process is more problematic for those events for
which there is little or no prior experience of failure as the evidence base is invariably
limited. In combination, these processes of denial and self-deception generate
organisational practices that are typified by their ineffectiveness in dealing with the
potential for failure (Trivers, 2013). As a consequence, they allow crises to incubate as a
function of routine activities.
We can conceptualise the relationships between crisis and effectiveness in terms of
the ways in which an organisation is seen as being prone to crisis and/or equipped to
deal with the task demands generated by a crisis event. Whilst this distinction between
the crisis prone and crisis prepared organisation (Mitroff et al., 1989; Pauchant
and Mitroff, 1992) seems on the face it to be a binary process, these should be seen
as absolute states of being with a set of transitional states existing between
them. Figure 1 highlights the main elements associated with these two system states
and their interconnected nature. What Figure 1 seeks to illustrate, albeit in a simplified
manner, is the interconnected and temporal relationships between being an effective
organisation and one that is ineffective (and therefore potentially prone to crisis).
The implication is that all organisations, irrespective of how effective they are,
have the potential to be faced with a crisis event, which results from either internal
or external factors or a combination of the two. Clearly, those organisations that are
ineffective in dealing with the shifts in organisational task demands are likely to be
more prone to a crisis event. It is here that Perrow’s notion of “normal” accidents is
important in our understanding of the transition from one systems state to another.
Perrow argues essentially that the normal day-to-day processes within a system
have the potential to fail and that these failures will expose the vulnerabilities
that exist in the normal functions and processes within organisations.
Generally ‘effective’
organisations
Organisational
Effectiveness
Organisational controls are effective in dealing with the
task demands generated by the organisation and its
environment, especially in terms of identifying and
dealing with aberrant behaviours and responding to
early warnings. May be typified by the some of the
characteristics of high reliability organisations although
the potential for “normal” accidents remains
Organisational
Crisis
Organisations with
Crisis prone
tendencies
Emergent fractures across a number of key
controls allow for the erosion of dynamic
capabilities within the organisation. Information
flows are inhibited and this compounds
problems around sense making, emergence,
and control. Steady state effectiveness may be
impacted upon by “normal” accidents. Typified
by a complex environmental setting
Downward spiral of ineffectiveness allows multiple
layers of defences to be systematically by-passed
resulting in the onset of a crisis. If uncorrected, these
conditions have the potential to result in the failure of
the organisation to survive in its current form
A
B
Figure 1.
Crisis and effectiveness
as symbiotic processes
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These vulnerabilities are ultimately exposed through the structural aspects of
organisational systems and these can be expressed in terms of its complexity and
tightly coupled nature (Perrow, 1984, 1997, 1999, 2004). These failures can take place
at different levels of the system from the operating core through to the more strategic
elements and the nature of the coupling and complexity can allow incidents to
escalate into more damaging accidents (Shrivastava et al., 2009a). The interactions
between these different levels of the organisation and their relative contributions
towards failure reflects Turner’s earlier work on incubation, and is also related to
Reason’s distinction between latent and active errors in organisational failure
(Reason, 1990, 1997; Turner, 1976, 1978, 1994). Irrespective of the root cause of the
failure process, the more “interactively complex” the system and the more “tightly
coupled” the speed of interaction is between systems components, the more likely the
system is to rapidly spiral out of control (Perrow, 1984). Thus, attempts to develop
more efficient organisations – with a focus on such processes as just in time (which
can rapidly become “just to late”) – may result in an erosion of organisational
effectiveness and aid in the transition to crisis.
There are three important elements to understanding the nature of a crisis. The first
is the nature of the environment in which the organisation is operating. The second
concerns the capabilities of the organisation to respond to the task demands generated
by these environmental characteristics. The third element relates to the emergent
state of crisis itself – at what stage of a crisis is the organisation perceived to be in
at a particular point in space and time? For our current purposes, we can conceptualise
this process within a systems “space” that incorporates these three elements and
this is illustrated in Figure 2. Effectiveness thus has to be judged against the very
different task demands generated in each of these crisis states and at different points in
space and time.
Effectiveness can be seen, therefore, as a multi-level and multi-speed process that is
a function of the interaction between the capabilities within the organisation and
the impact of the environment upon these capabilities, with the whole process evolving
over both space and time. Within Figure 2, the environment in which the organisation
operates is shown in terms of the three systems states that have been outlined by
Crisis of
Management
Organisational
Effectiveness
Organisational
Crisis
Crisis of
Legitimation
Operational
Crisis
Ordered Environment
Complex Environment
Chaotic EnvironmentFigure 2.
Framing effectiveness
and crisis
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Kauffman (1993); and Kauffman and Johnsen (1991) namely: the ordered, complex, and
chaotic states. Each of these environmental states will bring with them a range of
different task demands and the organisation’s abilities to deal with these demands
will be a measure of its “fitness” or effectiveness. The task demands generated in each
of these three systems states will require a range of organisational capabilities that will
allow it to transit these changes in environmental conditions and to do so on different
time scales. It is our contention that this “fitness” will also be manifest across the three
distinct, but interrelated phases of a crisis: the crisis of management, the operational
crisis, and the crisis of legitimation (Smith, 1990). Within the crisis of management
phase, it is the (in)abilities of the organisation to cope with the environmental task
demands that will incubate conditions that will ultimately determine its transition
to a crisis (Turner, 1976, 1978, 1994). This can occur as a function of a range of
“normal” processes (Perrow, 1984) in which the errors and violations of operators and
decision makers (Reason, 1990, 1997) may serve to set the conditions for a transition
to crisis once a shift in environmental conditions exposes these vulnerabilities.
Small deviations in operating processes – a set of routine violations – can lead the
organisation to deviate from its designed for state in such a way that emergent
properties start to move the system outside of the established parameters of control
(Smith, 2005). One example of this incubation process can be seen to occur around
the financial crisis, where the assumptions made by key figures within the
sector about the products that they offered and the way in which the market would
perform, ultimately created the conditions for failure as the sub-prime market started
to collapse.
This type of initial failure, moves the organisation into the “operational
crisis” – that phase normally associated with a crisis event (Smith, 1995). Obvious
examples here include those catastrophic failures where the emergency services are
required to effect rescue and where the event spirals out of the control of managers
within the organisation. The release of methyl isocyanate from the Union Carbide
plant in Bhopal is an example of this uncontrolled state of crisis (Hazarika, 1987;
Lapierre and Moro, 2002; Shrivastava, 1987). The operational phase of a crisis can
also be typified by a “slow burn” event where the crisis builds in momentum over a
long period of time. The Yewtree inquiry into the post-Saville abuse case in the UK is
an example of such an event where the initial crisis became much broader in its scope
and impact.
The final phase of a crisis is seen as the “crisis of legitimation”, in which there is a
search for culpability and blame as various groups seek to make sense of the failure
process (Smith, 1990). This phase also represents processes around organisational
turnaround, business recovery, and the repairing of reputational damage which, if they
are not dealt with, may trigger a further crisis (Sipika and Smith, 1993; Smith and
Sipika, 1993). In some crises, the legitimation phase can generate task demands for the
organisation many years after the event. Perhaps the most obvious example
concerns, the terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001, but another example would include
the crowd crushing accident at Hillsborough in 1989 that is still the subject of
formal investigation in 2014[2] (see, e.g. the press coverage around alleged cover-ups:
Brown, 2014).
It is within this “space” that these processes interact and which gives rise to the
perception of effectiveness, its defining characteristics, and the organisational
responses to the range of task demands that are generated in each systems state.
A key element of the process of determining effectiveness will be the ways in which the
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organisation can create, validate, and utilise its knowledge-based resources as a means
of shaping the responses to these task demands across all three phases of a crisis.
To use Rumsfeld’s (2002, 2011) categorisation, this involves recognising that many of
the so-called “knowns” are often shrouded by a number of unknown elements. It also
requires organisations to recognise that there are limitations imposed upon decision
making by the “known unknowns” and that the assumptions made about these can
also shape the incubation of crisis. Finally, there are clear issues around those elements
of failure potential that we simply do not recognise, never mind understand
(the “unknown unknowns”) and that can arise both through a lack of knowledge
and insight, but which may also be generated as a function of paradigm blindness. An
effective organisation recognises the nature of this spectrum of uncertainty around
knowledge and ensures that it’s information capturing processes seek to recognise the
lack of precision that sometimes accompanies discussions around risk (consisting
of both probability and consequence). This invariably includes significant elements of
these unknowns and especially around issues of cause and effective relationships,
predictive validity, and the burden of proof. What typifies the Rumsfeld categorisation
is the importance of knowledge in shaping both the sensemaking and the
communication processes within organisations. The failure to acknowledge
the limitations of the knowledge base underpinning decisions is a key aspect in the
processes around incubation.
Thus, we might argue that effectiveness, risk, and uncertainty are linked as
constructs in a symbiotic set of relationships that occur across a range of
environmental states. An organisation can only be effective if it understands the
limitations of its own knowledge base, the extent to which its known risks are cloaked
in uncertainty, and the limitations of expert judgements around the burden of proof
and the construction of knowledge. What also becomes important in this context is the
manner in which the time constraints generated in each of these systems states
impacts on the processing of information (especially in terms of the steps needed to
decode that information). In a rapidly changing task environment, this ability is a key
attribute. A key element of these relationships centres on the abilities of the
organisation and its members to “control” the processes at work – a point illustrated
by the case of MH370.
The disappearance of MH370 – challenges for organisational effectiveness
On the 8 March 2014, a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 (MH370) disappeared on a
routine flight en route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing. The aircraft was carrying 227
passengers and 12 crew (BBC News Asia, 2014a), there was no known mayday call
from the aircraft[3], and no wreckage belonging to the aircraft has been found on any
of the alleged routes that the plane had been deemed to take[4]. As of the end of
September 2014, there was no conclusive evidence as to the location of the aircraft or
the reasons behind its disappearance (BBC News Asia, 2014a). This was despite an
extensive search, the raising of a number of false alarms about wreckage being spotted,
and a series of alleged sightings of the aircraft at different locations (Branigan et al.,
2014; Lagan and Lewis, 2014a; Pank and Bremner, 2014). The aircraft is believed to be
somewhere in a 60,000 km2 area of the Southern Indian Ocean (Australian Transport
Safety Bureau, 2014; BBC News Asia, 2014b).
The crash of an aircraft would normally be considered as a crisis for the operating
company due to the potential loss of life, the need to deal with multiple stakeholders,
the loss of the airframe itself (and the compensation requirements associated with mass
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fatalities), along with the damage to the organisation’s reputation (see, e.g. Sipika and
Smith, 1993; Smith, 1992). The loss of MH370 was even more problematic because the
plane had simply disappeared and there was little information regarding its potential
whereabouts or the reasons for its disappearance. This information vacuum raised an
additional set of questions about the company’s abilities to control its operations,
monitor its aircraft and assess the suitability of its aircrew to fly. These issues, which
could be seen as essential elements in determining the airline’s effectiveness, served to
move the organisation into crisis. The fact that the company could not provide answers
to the whereabouts or status of the aircraft had an impact on the company’s reputation,
an issue that was fuelled in part by the intense speculation that took place in the first
14 days of the crisis. The crisis quickly spiralled out of the control of Malaysia
Airlines and saw the Malaysian Government play an increasingly pivotal role in
briefing the press about the nature of the disappearance and exposing tensions with
other nations in the process (Wan and Denyer, 2014). The search for the plane in the
early stages of the crisis was reported to involve some nine countries and in the order
of 34 aircraft and 40 ships (Denyer and Harlan, 2014). The problems were
compounded when it became clear that the transponder on the plane may have been
deliberately switched off as the aircraft left Malaysian airspace giving rise to intense
speculation about the potential causes of the disappearance (Doward et al., 2014;
Hodal, 2014; Hodal et al., 2014a; Hookham and Sheridan, 2014). Some of this
speculation invariably focused on intentional human actions, either by the pilots or
passengers on board the aircraft (Doward et al., 2014; Hodal, 2014; Hodal and
Kaiman, 2014; Lewis, 2014a, b, c; Lewis and Lagan, 2014), although there was no firm
evidence to support many of these theories beyond the fact that the transponder
“stopped working” as the aircraft left Malaysian airspace. There was also some
speculation around latent errors (Bremner and Lewis, 2014; Lagan and Lewis, 2014b;
Sheridan, 2014) – those aspects of organisational culture that can create the
conditions for failure – although again there was little in the way of evidence to
support such theories.
The difficulties associated with determining what was known about the nature of
the aircraft’s disappearance generated problems not just for Malaysia Airlines but also
for the Malaysian Government, as both sought to provide information to relatives and
the media about the fate of the aircraft. The effectiveness of these two organisations
was judged, in part, by their apparent inabilities to deal with the informational task
demands that they faced and to provide answers as to why their information
appeared to be so sparse. This was further compounded by the comments expressed
within the media around the control (and monitoring) of aircraft. In this case, the lack
of precise information about the whereabouts of the aircraft generated considerable
surprise and debate within the media and challenged the popular assumption
that our increasingly sophisticated technical systems provide airline operators
with up-to-date and accurate information about their aircraft. To an extent, the
disappearance of MH370 illustrated the limitations of organisational control and
information provision, and highlighted the manner in which routine operations
can fail without much prior warning, raising questions about the nature of
organisational effectiveness.
MH370 challenges the presumption of control within socio-technical systems. It also
illustrates how organisational factors can heighten the impact associated with
a failure event once those controls cease to function effectively. This was apparent
when it emerged that there were delays in the organisational responses to the initial
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disappearance of the aircraft (Ministry of Transport, 2014). The lack of clear and
credible information and evidence also served to generate a high level of uncertainty
within the crisis response process and this caused additional speculation in the press
as to what might have happened to the aircraft. This speculation involved a range of
allegations, including those that the Malaysian Government was not providing all
of the information that they had about the aircraft’s known movements (Branigan,
2014a; Wan and Liu, 2014). Media speculation also ranged across such contributing
factors as terrorism, hijacking, pilot suicide, airframe failure, cargo fires, and other
forms of catastrophic mechanical failures of the aircraft (Bremner and Lewis, 2014;
Doward et al., 2014; Halsey et al., 2014; Hodal, 2014; Lagan and Lewis, 2014b). In one
particular case, a suggestion was made that this might be an example of the world’s
first cyber hijacking (Fielding and Winter, 2014; Robinson, 2014), although there
was no evidence provided to support this claim beyond a reference to it being
theoretically possible!
Ironically it was the lack of information and evidence that was then seen by some
in the media as a major driver behind the speculation (Farhi, 2014), thereby
generating a vicious circle of misinformation that created additional task demands
for both the Malaysian Government and the airline operator. MH370 also illustrates
the manner in which constrained information flows can generate conditions that can
move an organisation into an unstable state and which can then contribute to the
rapid onset of a crisis. The context in which any crisis takes place is both conditioned
by such information shortcomings and also by an organisation’s inabilities to
cope effectively with these additional task demands. Thus, the problem becomes
self-reinforcing – the inabilities of the organisation to deal with the uncertainty
adds a further layer of complexity and uncertainty to the crisis as the organisation
is perceived by external actors as having little, if any, control over the events.
The resultant speculation and the development of conspiracy theories also adds to
the task demands facing the organisation and may inhibit the effective recovery
after the event.
The case of MH370 also illustrates many of the characteristics of an
organisational crisis event. It shows how an apparently effective organisation,
working under relatively steady-state conditions, can quickly move to a highly
unstable crisis state. Here, both the operating company and the Malaysian
Government rapidly moved into a state of “crisis” as a result of the aircraft’s
disappearance and this was escalated further, largely as a function of their inabilities
to provide accurate information about the aircraft, the attention of the media, and the
need to co-ordinate an international search operation over a vast geographical area.
Both organisations were faced with the difficulties associated with trying to account
for the whereabouts of the aircraft, the manner of its disappearance, the demands for
information from grieving relatives, and the additional task demands generated by
the intense media interest in the disappearance. The MH370 crisis was particularly
characterised by the extent of the “unknowns” surrounding the disappearance of
the aircraft thereby illustrating the limitations of our knowledge about the ways in
which some “systems in use” function. For MH370, this centred on the extent to
which both weak signals and the range of the potential unknowns (arising through
a lack of information as well as emergent conditions) were managed, both before
and during the crisis. It illustrates how important uncertainty is, especially around
the escalation of a crisis, and how it needs to be incorporated into our decision
making, communication, and approaches to contingency planning. The early stages
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of the MH370 crisis were marked by conflicting information, uncertainty, and a range
of concerns about the effectiveness of the search and rescue response carried out by
the Malaysian Government. This led to allegations from the Chinese Government
in the early stages of the crisis that the search and rescue activity was typified
by “too much confusion” (Phillips and Moore, 2014). Given the absence of evidence
relating to the fate of MH370, this confusion could be seen as a natural outcome of the
early stages of a crisis and has been found to occur in other events where the nature
of causality has not been determined early in the process (Sipika and Smith, 1993;
Smith, 1990; Smith and Sipika, 1993). The disappearance also shows the multi-level
nature of the challenges generated by a crisis and the implications that such
events have for our understanding of organisational effectiveness. It illustrates the
heightened emotional state amongst stakeholders that invariably surrounds loss of
life events of this nature. Many of these challenges sit outside of the “normal” task
demands faced by organisations, especially in terms of task complexity, the
management of uncertainty (and the associated processes around the management of
emergent conditions), along with issues relating to the management of scale (which
often become manifest in terms of the spatial, interorganisational, and temporal
aspects of the crisis).
MH370 shows how the notion of organisational effectiveness and the perception of
crisis can be intrinsically linked. It challenges the unitary measure of both the
nature of effectiveness (as a managerial and procedural construct) and the
conceptualisation of crisis as a “state of being” for an organisation. Both terms, it is
argued here, need to be considered as multi-layered issues (Yammarino and Dansereau,
2002) as they are concepts which defy simple interpretations and they are also
invariably determined by a complex set of interactions between internal organisational
processes and external challenges and task demands. Changing environmental
conditions ensure that an organisation can only be effective at certain points in space
and time and, therefore, an organisation cannot be seen as universally effective.
In some respects, thses relationships mirror many of the previous discussions around
the notion of “excellence” (Hitt and Ireland, 1987; Pascale and Athos, 1981; Peters and
Waterman, 1982) and it is clear that organisations can struggle to maintain that level of
performance (Pascale, 1990). The loss of MH370 also shows how apparently effective
organisations are prone to crises because they make assumptions around their abilities
to manage under certain (often extreme) environmental conditions (Pascale, 1990;
Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Vaughan, 1990, 1999). These assumptions, along with
the core beliefs and values of managers, have been seen to play a significant role in the
generation of organisational cultures that have a propensity towards crisis (Mitroff
et al., 1989). Another perspective relating to the relationships between effectiveness
and crisis can be seen to exist once a crisis is triggered. An organisation’s crisis or
contingency planning processes also need to be effective and must be set against the
spectrum of demands that the organisation may need to respond to. This creates two
significant challenges for managers. First, it can be framed in terms of their abilities to
control the incubation of the crisis before it occurs and respond effectively to its task
demands as it emerges. Second, a crisis generates a requirement to communicate
with the range of stakeholders that are affected by the event and to do so in
a situation that is typified by a high level of emotional pressure. The result of
such a crisis is the generation of a series of challenges for management that will
challenge their capabilities. These include the limitations of certain key assumptions
around control, the management of information flows (both known and unknowns),
435
Organisational
ineffectiveness
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
and the impact that these issues have for the generation of emergent conditions.
Unless organisations prepare to deal with these challenges as part of their preparation
for crisis management then they are unlikely to be able to maintain their effectiveness
under such challenging conditions.
Figure 3 attempts to illustrate how organisational ineffectiveness at multiple levels
within a crisis allows the event to spiral out from an initially controlled state (in this
case, at the point at which the aircraft disappears) into a state of crisis. Of course,
it is highly likely that there will be evidence of organisational ineffectiveness in the
period prior to the aircraft’s disappearance, but that can only be speculation at this
point in time. There are some obvious vulnerabilities that are self-evident, however.
These include the ability to disable a transponder on the flight deck, the reliance on
the physical recovery of data from the flight data recorders (rather than constantly
streaming the data throughout the flight), and the apparent inability of ground-based
radar to track an aircraft in flight.
The disappearance of MH370 triggered the onset of a complex, multi-layered crisis
that involved a number of national governments, search teams, and organisations.
The notion of a triggering process is often seen as a characteristic of a crisis (Smith,
1990, 1995; Turner, 1976, 1978) as it highlights the transition from a stable (or ordered)
state to one in which the complexity of the situation moves the organisation into a more
complex environment. It is this move away from an organisation’s designed for
state – its “normal” operating conditions – that can be seen as an important element of
the onset of a crisis. If the organisation is incapable of dealing with these initial shifts in
task demands then it is likely that the actions taken will propel the organisation further
into a state of crisis. Invariably, these early stages are typified by information
asymmetries – where the demand for information and clarity around causality often
Crisis briefings
fail to reassure
affected parties
Crisis continues
generating additional
task demands
Movement away
from equilibrium
conditions
Additional task
demands created by
international search
coordination Aircraft
disappeared
No evidence of
aircraft location
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initiating search
and rescue
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aircraft found
Continued
uncertainty over
the aircraft’s
location
Continued media
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Search patterns
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Figure 3.
MH370 as a spiral away
from equilibrium
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exceeds the abilities of the organisation to satisfy that demand. The presence of
multiple stakeholders in the event compounds this problem as there will be a range
of demands for information provision and different “standards” by which the
performance of the organisation in providing that information will be judged. Decision
makers will have to deal with this problem of information shortfall whilst, at the same
time, attempting to provide clarity of information to prevent the event from spiralling
further out of control. These were characteristics of the early stages surrounding the
disappearance of MH370.
MH370 – implications for organisational effectiveness
The loss of MH370, highlighted some of the challenges that can face organisations in
dealing with a complex, multi-dimensional crisis that involves multiple stakeholders.
The lack of information, and the potential scale of the investigation have proved to be a
significant challenge for the multinational crisis and investigation teams involved in
the search for the aircraft (Branigan, 2014b; Branigan and Hodal, 2014b; Harlan and
Denyer, 2014). In part, the lack of information led to the development of multiple
narratives around the causal factors surrounding the disappearance of the aircraft
(Branigan, 2014c; Branigan and Kaiman, 2014; Denyer and Harlan, 2014). These
“narratives” evolved in the early stages of the crisis as the authorities were unable to
find any trace of the aircraft or wreckage that could be attributed to it. Early reports
suggested that a number of alleged eye witness claimed that the aircraft had been seen
in flames falling from the sky (Branigan and Hodal, 2014a) whereas other accounts
speculated that the aircraft had deviated from its flight path and headed back over
the Malaysian Peninsula (Branigan and Kaiman, 2014; Harlan and Denyer, 2014).
As the information regarding the track taken by the aircraft came to light, there were
other theories about where the aircraft may have crashed (Lagan, 2014c; Lagan and
Lewis, 2014b). Other speculation around causality concerned the alleged potential for
cracks in the aircraft hull of the aircraft type, which had been raised by the US Federal
Aviation Authority (Bremner and Lewis, 2014) as well as suggestions that batteries
being carried by the aircraft may have caused a fire (Lagan and Lewis, 2014b). By the
15th March, it emerged that there seemed to be compelling evidence
of direct human action in turning off the aircraft’s communications systems leading
to speculation of a terrorist attack (Doward et al., 2014; Hookham and Sheridan, 2014;
Lewis, 2014a, b; Pank and Bremner, 2014). In response, the Minister of Transport
commented that:
It could have been done intentionally, it could be done under duress, it could have been done
because of an explosion, that’s why I don’t want to go into the realm of speculation. We are
looking at all the possibilities (Hishammuddon Hussein cited in, Hodal et al., 2014a, p. 3).
The result was a further widening of the search area as the authorities sought to make
sense of the incident (Hodal et al., 2014b). By April, the search area had been shifted to
the Southern Ocean and an area in the Indian Ocean closer to Australia following the
detection of pings believed to be from the aircraft’s black boxes (Associated Press,
2014; Hodal et al., 2014b; Lagan, 2014b; BBC News Asia, 2014c). This search failed to
reveal any wreckage of the aircraft. By the end of June, information was emerging that
pointed, once again, to the alleged intentional actions of people on the flight deck
(Pearlman, 2014) although the pilots were believed to have been unconscious for hours
(Lagan, 2014a) and that the passengers were probably suffocated before the aircraft ran
out of fuel and crashed (Reuters, 2014).
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The loss of MH370 illustrated one of the fundamental elements of a crisis namely
the lack of information and the speculation that invariably takes place in the
media about the causes of the event resulting in an escalation of the crisis (Frewer
et al., 2002; Hill, 2001; Yannopoulou et al., 2010), in this case the speculation
ranged over both causality and the location of the aircraft (Farhi, 2014; Halsey, 2014;
Harlan and Wan, 2014). There was a considerable amount of speculation across the
various strands of the media and a number of conspiracy theories emerged,
especially on online web sites. At the root of this problem was the lack of information
provided by the authorities, leading one media commentator from CNN to observe
that:
[y] the bottom line is the authorities and those who are supposed to know simply do not
(Chris Cuomo cited in Farhi, 2014, p. C2).
In the absence of information speculation invariably fills the void and provides
an illustration of how ineffective processes around information management in
organisations can, under crisis conditions, compound the problems that the
organisation faces. In this particular case, the media speculation generates
additional pressure on the airline and the government to refute some of the
unhelpful speculation whilst trying to provide information that is useful to media
commentators.
The challenges of this incident highlight the task difficulties that face those teams
who are charged with managing such crises. These include: the difficulties around
information flows, the uncertainty inherent in decision making as a consequence, the
stress generated by the external pressures on those teams handling the event, and the
challenges of intergroup communication. Against this background, it is possible to
frame the notion of organisational effectiveness as symptomatic of the “designed for
state” of the organisations where the core organisational processes are in a symbiotic
relationship with the task demands and capabilities (see, e.g. Hodge and Coronado,
2007; Tsoukas, 1999; Tsoukas and Dooley, 2011). In such a context, the capabilities of
the organisation will match the task demands imposed upon it but will also be able to
absorb fluctuations in those task demands. Against that background, one might argue
that effective organisations should have a degree of slack built into their capabilities
that would allow them to absorb perturbations on the system and do so in such
a way that there are no longer term impacts on performance. However, the provision of
that capability requires additional resource and it will impact on the short-term
financial efficiencies of the organisation. Too much redundancy and the organisation is
inefficient and too little and it is ineffective within the context of its task demands at
particular points in space and time. Thus, the ability to deal with such surges in task
demands are key to determining organisational effectiveness over the longer term.
The focus on lean organisations seeks to balance a line between this efficiency and
effectiveness relationship. However, by eroding slack within an organisation we risk
making it more brittle to the perturbations that it could face and the processes around
“just in time” can easily transition to a state where they become “just too late”. It is this
transitional state that often marks the move of an organisation into conditions that are
described as a crisis.
Conclusions
This paper has sought to set out a framework for considering the relationships
between effectiveness and crisis. The relationships between these two sets
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of symbiotic processes are in need of further research, especially around the central
role that human resources play across all three phases of a crisis. A crisis, it has
been argued, can be seen to occur when an organisation moves from a relatively
ordered or complicated task environment into a chaotic one, where it does not
have the dynamic capabilities to cope with the task demands of the event. As such,
the event exceeds, or comes close to exceeding, the organisation’s abilities to cope.
In the case of MH370, Malaysia Airlines moved from an ordered state – where
the aircraft was believed to be flying normally to its destination – to a complex
state when it disappeared from radar and failed to arrive in Beijing. Very quickly
the event moved into a chaotic state when it became apparent that no one knew
where the aircraft was. It soon became clear that little was known about the flight
of MH370 once it left the control of Malaysian ATC. Media speculation about
the cause of the disappearance became rife, with theories speculating that it was
catastrophic failure, through pilot suicide, to terrorist hijacking. Whilst each
of these scenarios was “plausible”, there was little tangible evidence in the early
stages of the event to support any scenario in a concrete manner. Again, this is
not uncommon in crises where the immediate aftermath of the event is fraught
with uncertainty. Even by the 30th June, over 100 days after the disappearance,
there was still no proof of what had happened, despite numerous suggestions
within the media.
What this particular crisis illustrates is the manner in which such events progress
through distinct but interlinked stages and it is possible to argue that a crisis emerges
as a function of the failure of the organisations involved to cope with the very
different environmental states that emerge. The loss of MH370 highlights the manner
in which organisational effectiveness can quickly degenerate into a crisis state. At the
point at which the aircraft disappeared, it propelled Malaysia Airlines into a state
of crisis where its environment moved from a relatively ordered state into one that
was increasingly chaotic. The crisis spiraled outwards to include the Malaysian
Government and also extended in space and time as the search area widened. At the
time of writing, the search for the aircraft was expected to take an additional year and
the recovery of the remains of the aircraft, assuming that it was even possible,
extended beyond that timeframe.
The paper has explored the relationships between the various stages of a crisis
and the factors that contribute to a transition into crisis. It has highlighted
the symbiotic relationships that exist between crisis and effectiveness where an
erosion of the latter, at different points in space and time, can lead to the emergence
of the former. Crises, it has been argued, arise when organisations fail to
respond to the task demands generated by shifts in the environment and
these new conditions generate emergent conditions that move the organisation
from its designed for state, thereby eroding the controls that are in place
within the organisation. However, the relationships between effectiveness and
crisis are themselves complicated and further work is needed to ensure that
the relationships are explored in more detail. There are several areas of research
that are worthy of further attention within this journal. First, the processes
around which crises are incubated within organisations that are deemed to be
effective remains an area where there is still considerable debate. The tensions
between high-reliability theory and natural accident theory is one area where this
debate is still active (Perrow, 2009; Shrivastava et al., 2009a, b) and the relationships
between these theoretical perspectives and the processes around organisational
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effectiveness are also in need of additional research. Second, the range of
boundary-spanning processes that exist at the interfaces between crisis, complex
socio-technical systems, and the environment and their contribution to effectiveness
are also in need of additional research. In particular, the different levels
of granularity at which these processes occur and the manner in which they
can interact to erode effectiveness at key points within the system. The conditions
that allow latent and active errors to expose vulnerabilities and trigger
these boundary-spanning processes in the process, is an area that is also poorly
understood when it comes to organisational effectiveness. Third, the processes
around effectiveness and the performance of crisis management teams, again at
different levels within organisational structures, is an area of work that has not had
the attention within the management literature that it deserves. The question of
what effectiveness means in each of the phases of a crisis and at various points in
space and time is an important issue in the discussion of organisational effectiveness
and the processes by which it can be eroded. Finally, the issue of effectiveness within
the crisis of legitimation phase remains an area that is under researched, particularly
in terms of the ways that effectiveness can be restored to those organisations whose
reputations have been damaged. The relationships between organisational
effectiveness and crisis is a fertile area for research and one in which our lack of
understanding of the interrelationships that exist will contribute to the erosion
of effectiveness in a vicious circle. As such, is an area that should be central to the
work of this journal. If this paper can stimulate debate in that area then it will have
achieved its aim.
Notes
1. This literature can be found in a diverse body of work that transcends such subjects as
ergonomics, human factors, and applied psychology, as well as science and technology
studies and the management of technological change.
2. The Hillsborough disaster was subject to a formal inquiry by Lord Justice Taylor in 1989 and
there have been several subsequent investigations that have sought to refute some of the
early findings.
3. The transcript of the cockpit exchanges with Malaysian air traffic control can be found at:
www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/2014/newsspec_7440/transcript.pdf
4. Despite an extensive search for wreckage, no firm evidence of the plane had been found by
the 31 May 2014.
References
Ashby, W.R. (1958), “Requisite variety and its implications for the control of complex systems”,
Cybernetica, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 83-99.
Associated Press (2014), “Without sounds, search for plane stalls”, TheWashington Post, 9 April,
p. A9.
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2014), MH370 – Definition of Underwater Search Areas,
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Canberra.
BBC News Asia (2014a), “Missing Malaysia plane MH370: what we know”, BBC News Asia,
8 September, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26503141 (accessed 30
September 2014).
440
JOEPP
1,4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
BBC News Asia (2014b), “New missing Malaysian plane MH370 search area announced”, BBC
News Asia, 26 June, available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-28031741 (accessed 30
September 2014).
BBC News Asia (2014c), “Missing Malaysia plane: search ‘regains recorder signal’”, BBC News
Asia, 9 April.
Boisot, M. and Child, J. (1999), “Organizations as adaptive systems in complex environments: the
case of China”, Organization Science, Vol. 10 No. 3, pp. 237-252.
Bonhomme, P. (2014), “Live from the cockpityy”, British Airways Highlife Magazine,
May, p. 110.
Branigan, T. (2014a), “Anger boils over as missing plane saga yields no answers”, The Guardian,
20 March, p. 25.
Branigan, T. (2014b), “As the search shifts, will MH 370 finally give up its terrible secret”, The
Observer, 16 March, pp. 4-5.
Branigan, T. (2014c), “Malaysia’s plea for radar data in search for missing jet”, The Guardian,
19 March, p. 21.
Branigan, T. and Hodal, K. (2014a), “‘All right, good night’ – last words from MH370”, The
Guardian, 13 March, p. 22.
Branigan, T. and Hodal, K. (2014b), “Tears and shock at mystery of missing flight”, The
Observer, 9 March, pp. 2-3.
Branigan, T. and Kaiman, J. (2014), “Plane mystery deepens with claim that it had turned and
flown back over Malaysia”, The Guardian, 12 March, p. 16.
Branigan, T., Hurst, D. and Farrell, P. (2014), “First clue to jet’s fate? Ships race to scene where
satellite spotted ‘debris’”, The Guardian, 21 March, pp. 1-6.
Bremner, C. and Lewis, L. (2014), “Airlines were warned of cracks in missing plane”, The Times,
13 March, p. 1.
Brown, D. (2014), “Hillsborough police questioned over ‘manslaughter and cover-up’”, The Times,
28 March, p. 4.
Checkland, P.B. (1981), Systems Thinking, Systems Practice, Wiley, Chichester.
Checkland, P.B. and Scholes, J. (1990), Soft Systems Methodology in Action, Wiley,
Chichester.
de Carvalho, P.V.R. (2011), “The use of functional resonance analysis method (FRAM) in
a mid-air collision to understand some characteristics of the air traffic management system
resilience”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 96 No. 11, pp. 1482-1498.
Denyer, S. and Harlan, C. (2014), “Few clues to fate of Malaysian jetliner”, The Washington Post,
10 March, pp. A1-A7.
Doward, J., Hodal, K. and Branigan, T. (2014), “Missing plane ‘sabotaged on board’”, The
Observer, 16 March, p. 1, 6.
Elliott, D. and Smith, D. (2006), “Active learning from crisis: regulation, precaution and the UK
Football Industry’s response to disaster”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 43 No. 2,
pp. 289-317\.
Elliott, D., Smith, D. and McGuinness, M. (2000), “Exploring the failure to learn: crises and the
barriers to learning”, Review of Business, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 17-24.
English, D. and Branaghan, R.J. (2012), “An empirically derived taxonomy of pilot violation
behavior”, Safety Science, Vol. 50 No. 2, pp. 199-209.
Farhi, P. (2014), “When there is no certainty, airtime fills with speculation”, TheWashington Post,
15 March, p. C1, C2.
441
Organisational
ineffectiveness
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
Fediuk, T.A., Pace, K.M. and Botero, I.C. (2010), “Crisis response effectiveness: methodological
considerations for advancement in empirical investigation into response impact”,
in Coombs, W.T. and Holladay S.J. (Eds), The Handbook of Crisis Communication,
Wiley-Blackwell, London, pp. 221-242.
Fielding, J. and Winter, S. (2014), “World’s first cyber hijack: was missing Malaysian Airlines
flight hacked with mobile phone”, The Daily Express, 16 March, available at:
www.express.co.uk/news/world/465126/Missing-Malaysia-Airlines-plane-may-have-been-
cyber-hijacked-using-mobile-phone (accessed 30 September 2014).
Fischbacher-Smith, D. (2012), “Getting pandas to breed: paradigm blindness and the policy
space for risk prevention”, Mitigation and Management. Risk Management, Vol. 14 No. 3,
pp. 177-201.
Fortune, J. and Peters, G. (1995), Learning From Failure – The Systems Approach, John Wiley and
Sons, Chichester.
Frewer, L.J., Miles, S. and Marsh, R. (2002), “The media and genetically modified foods:
evidence in support of social amplification of risk”, Risk Analysis, Vol. 22 No. 4,
pp. 701-711.
Halsey, A. III (2014), “Dubious data may underlie report of jet’s path”, The Washington Post,
13 March, p. A11.
Halsey, A. III, Harlan, C. and Gowen, A. (2014), “Jet’s erratic flight increases fear of a ‘criminal
event’”, The Washington Post, 15 March, p. A1, A12.
Harlan, C. and Denyer, S. (2014), “Plane reportedly veered hundreds of miles off track before
signal was lost”, The Washington Post, 12 March, p. A12.
Harlan, C. and Wan, W. (2014), “Airliner search widens amid confusion”, The Washington Post,
13 March, p. A11.
Harris, D. and Li, W.C. (2010), “An extension of the human factors analysis and classification
system for use in open systems”, Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science, Vol. 12 No. 2,
pp. 108-128.
Hazarika, S. (1987), Bhopal. The Lessons of a Tragedy, Penguin Books, New Delhi.
Hill, A. (2001), “Media risks: the social amplification of risk and the media violence debate”,
Journal of Risk Research, Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 209-225.
Hitt, M.A. and Ireland, R.D. (1987), “Peters and waterman revisited: the unended quest for
excellence”, The Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 91-98.
Hodal, K. (2014), “Missing plane: hijacking theory gains weight”, The Guardian, 17 March,
p. 19.
Hodal, K. and Kaiman, J. (2014), “Mystery passengers ‘looked like Balotelli’ says official as
missing plane hunt goes on”, The Guardian, 11 March, p. 16.
Hodal, K., Branigan, T. and Topham, G. (2014a), “Latest theory: jet flew on for five hours with
communications switched off”, The Guardian, 15 March, p. 3.
Hodal, K., Branigan, T. and Topham, G. (2014b), “Search for lost Malaysian jet to be widened to
include Indian Ocean”, The Guardian, 14 March, p. 24.
Hodge, B. and Coronado, G. (2007), “Understanding change in organizations in
a far-from-equilibrium world”, Emergence: Complexity and Organizations, Vol. 9 No. 3,
pp. 3-15.
Hookham, M. and Sheridan, M. (2014), “Missing flight MH370 ‘diverted by deranged hijacker’”,
The Sunday Times, 16 March, p. 1.
Kauffman, S.A. (1993), The Origins of Order. Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford
University Press, New York, NY.
442
JOEPP
1,4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
Kauffman, S.A. and Johnsen, S. (1991), “Coevolution to the edge of chaos: coupled fitness
landscapes, poised states, and coevolutionary avalanches”, Journal of Theoretical Biology,
Vol. 149 No. 4, pp. 467-505.
Kontogiannis, T. and Malakis, S. (2012), “A systemic analysis of patterns of
organizational breakdowns in accidents: a case from Helicopter Emergency Medical
Service (HEMS) operations”, Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Vol. 99, March,
pp. 193-208.
Lagan, B. (2014a), “Missing jet pilots ‘were unconscious for hours’”, The Times, 27 June,
p. 35.
Lagan, B. (2014b), “Pings that could solve mystery of MH370”, The Times, 8 April, p. 7.
Lagan, B. (2014c), “We are finding a lot of objects. I think we’re in a debris field”, The Times,
29 March, p. 5.
Lagan, B. and Lewis, L. (2014a), “Dash by air and sea to identify debris”, The Times, Friday,
21 March 2014, p. 11.
Lagan, B. and Lewis, L. (2014b), “Missing plane was carrying batteries known to have started
aircraft fires”, The Times, 22 March, p. 17.
Lapierre, D. and Moro, J. (2002), Five Past Midnight in Bhopal, Warner Books, New York, NY.
Lewis, L. (2014a), “Did MH370 disappear after a fight broke out in the cockpit”, The Times,
17 March, p. 4.
Lewis, L. (2014b), “Saboteur suspected of steering aircraft off course”, The Times, 15 March,
p. 15.
Lewis, L. (2014c), “Suspicions fall on pilots of missing passenger jet”, The Times,
17 March, p. 1.
Lewis, L. and Lagan, B. (2014), “Did suicidal pilot crash MH370”, The Times, 18 March,
p. 14.
Li, W.-C. and Harris, D. (2006), “Pilot error and its relationship with higher organizational levels:
HFACS analysis of 523 accidents”, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, Vol. 77
No. 10, pp. 1056-1061.
Li, W.-C., Harris, D. and Yu, C.-S. (2008), “Routes to failure: analysis of 41 civil aviation accidents
from the Republic of China using the human factors analysis and classification system”,
Accident Analysis & Prevention, Vol. 40 No. 2, pp. 426-434.
McCarthy, J. (1989), “Advances in weather technology for the aviation system”, Proceedings of
the IEEE, Vol. 77 No. 11, pp. 1728-1734.
Ministry of Transport (2014), “MH370 preliminary report”, Serial 03/2014: 5, Office of the Chief
Inspector of Air Accidents, Ministry of Transport, Kuala Lumpur.
Mitroff, I.I., Pauchant, T.C., Finney, M. and Pearson, C. (1989), “Do (some) organizations cause
their own crises? Culture profiles of crisis prone vs crisis prepared organizations”,
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 269-283.
Pank, P. and Bremner, C. (2014), “Ocean debris suggests missing jet was hijacked”, The Times,
21 March, p. 1.
Pascale, R.T. (1990), Managing on the Edge: How Successful Companies use Conflict to Stay
Ahead, Penguin, Harmondsworth.
Pascale, R. and Athos, A. (1981), The Art of Japanese Management, Simon and Schuster,
New York, NY.
Pauchant, T.C. and Mitroff, I.I. (1992), Transforming the Crisis-Prone Organization. Preventing
Individual Organizational and Environmental Tragedies, Jossey-Bass Publishers,
San Francisco, CA.
443
Organisational
ineffectiveness
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
Pearlman, J. (2014), “MH370: new evidence of cockpit tampering as investigation into missing
plane continues”, The Telegraph, 29 June, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/asia/malaysia/10933917/MH10933370-New-evidence-of-cockpit-tampering-as-
investigation-into-missing-plane-continues.html (accessed 29 June 2014).
Perrow, C. (1984), Normal Accidents, Basic Books, New York, NY.
Perrow, C. (1997), “Organizing for environmental destruction”, Organization & Environment,
Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 66-72.
Perrow, C. (1999), “Organizing to reduce the vulnerabilities of complexity”, Journal of
Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 150-155.
Perrow, C. (2004), “A personal note on normal accidents”, Organization & Environment, Vol. 17
No. 1, pp. 9-14.
Perrow, C. (2009), “What’s needed is application not reconciliation: a response to Shrivastava,
Sonpar and Pazzaglia (2009)”, Human Relations, Vol. 62 No. 9, pp. 1391-1393.
Peters, T.J. and Waterman, R.H. (1982), In Search of Excellence, Harper & Row, New York, NY.
Phillips, T. and Moore, M. (2014), “China fury over the ‘chaos’ of Flight MH370”, The Daily
Telegraph, 14 March, p. 16.
Reason, J.T. (1990), Human Error, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Reason, J.T. (1997), Managing The Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate, Aldershot.
Reuters (2014), “MH370 passengers likely suffocated as plane coasted on autopilot Australia
says”, The Telegraph, 27 June, available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
malaysia/10929658/MH10929370-passengers-likely-suffocated-as-plane-coasted-on-
autopilot-Australia-says.html
Robinson, W. (2014), “Is missing Malaysian jet the world’s first cyber hijack?”, Mail Online,
16 March, available at: www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2582015/Is-missing-Malaysian-
plane-world-s-CYBER-HIJACK.html (accessed 30 September 2014).
Rumsfeld, D. (2002), “DoD news briefing – secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers”, News Transcript,
US Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public
Affairs), Washington, DC, available at: www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?
TranscriptID¼2636 (accessed 17 August 2011).
Rumsfeld, D. (2011), Known and Unknown. A Memoir, Sentinel, New York, NY.
Shappell, S., Detwiler, C., Holcomb, K., Hackworth, C., Boquet, A. and Wiegmann, D.A. (2007),
“Human error and commercial aviation accidents: an analysis using the human factors
analysis and classification system”, Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 227-242.
Sheridan, M. (2014), “Go for a cheap airline and flying doesn’t look so safe”, The Sunday Times,
23 March, p. 28.
Shrivastava, P. (1987), Bhopal. Anatomy of a Crisis, Ballinger Publishing Company,
Cambridge, MA.
Shrivastava, S., Sonpar, K. and Pazzaglia, F. (2009a), “Normal accident theory vs high reliability
theory: a resolution and call for an open systems view of accidents”, Human Relations,
Vol. 62 No. 9, pp. 1357-1390.
Shrivastava, S., Sonpar, K. and Pazzaglia, F. (2009b), “Reconciliation can lead to better
application: a rejoinder to Perrow (2009)”, Human Relations, Vol. 62 No. 9,
pp. 1395-1398.
Sipika, C. and Smith, D. (1993), “From disaster to crisis: the failed turnaround of Pan
American Airlines”, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol. 1 No. 3,
pp. 138-151.
444
JOEPP
1,4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
Smith, D. (1990), “Beyond contingency planning – towards a model of crisis management”,
Industrial Crisis Quarterly, Vol. 4 No. 4, pp. 263-275.
Smith, D. (1992), “The Kegworth aircrash – a crisis in three phases?”, Disaster Management,
Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 63-72.
Smith, D. (1995), “The dark side of excellence: managing strategic failures”, in
Thompson J. (Ed.), Handbook of Strategic Management, Butterworth-Heinemann,
London, pp. 161-191.
Smith, D. (2005), “Dancing with the mysterious forces of chaos: issues around complexity
knowledge and the management of uncertainty”, Clinician in Management, Vol. 13 Nos 3/4,
pp. 115-123.
Smith, D. (2006a), “The crisis of management: managing ahead of the curve”, in Smith, D. and
Elliott, D. (Eds), Key Readings in Crisis Management Systems and Structures for
Prevention and Recovery, Routledge, London, pp. 301-317.
Smith, D. (2006b), “Modelling the crisis management process: approaches and limitations”,
in Smith, D. and Elliott, D. (Eds), Key Readings in Crisis Management Systems and
Structures for Prevention and Recovery, Routledge, London, pp. 99-114.
Smith, D. and Elliott, D. (2007), “Exploring the barriers to learning from crisis: organizational
learning and crisis”, Management Learning, Vol. 38 No. 5, pp. 519-538.
Smith, D. and Sipika, C. (1993), “Back from the brink – post crisis management”, Long Range
Planning, Vol. 26 No. 1, pp. 28-38.
Topham, G. (2014), “Malaysia Airlines cuts 6,000 jobs”, The Guardian, Saturday, 30 August,
p. 43, available at: www.theguardian.com/business/2014/aug/2029/malaysia-airlines-cuts-
6000-jobs)
Trivers, R. (2013), Deceit and Self-Deception. Fooling Yourself the Better to Fool Others, Penguin
Books, London.
Tsoukas, H. (1999), “David and goliath in the risk society: making sense of the
conflict between shell and Greenpeace in the North Sea”, Organization, Vol. 6 No. 3,
pp. 499-528.
Tsoukas, H. and Dooley, K.J. (2011), “Introduction to the special issue: towards the ecological
style: embracing complexity in organizational research”, Organization Studies, Vol. 32
No. 6, pp. 729-735.
Turner, B.A. (1976), “The organizational and interorganizational development of disasters”,
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 378-397.
Turner, B.A. (1978), Man-Made Disasters, Wykeham, London.
Turner, B.A. (1994), “The causes of disaster: sloppy management”, British Journal of
Management, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 215-219.
Vaughan, D. (1990), “Autonomy, interdependence, and social control: NASA and the Space
Shuttle Challenger”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35 No. 2, pp. 225-257.
Vaughan, D. (1999), “The dark side of organizations: mistake, misconduct, and disaster”, Annual
Review of Sociology, Vol. 25, August, pp. 271-305.
Wan, W. and Denyer, S. (2014), “Long-simmering regional tensions emerge in search for plane”,
The Washington Post, 17 March, p. A16.
Wan, W. and Liu, L. (2014), “Vanished Malaysian Airlines flight leaves relatives with anger and
phantom phone calls”, The Washington Post, 10 March, available at: www.washington
post.com/world/vanished-malaysia-airlines-flight-leaves-relatives-with-anger-and-phantom-
phone-calls/2014/2003/2010/fdb78642-a78862-78611e78643-b78661e-78051b78648b78652d78606_
story.html (accessed 9 April 2014).
445
Organisational
ineffectiveness
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
West, K. (2014), “Is there a future for Malaysia Airlines after flights MH370 and MH17?”, The
Guardian, 29 July, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/29/is-there-a-future-
for-malaysia-airlines (accessed 30 September 2014).
Yammarino, F.J. and Dansereau, F. (Eds) (2002), The Many Faces of Multi-Level Issues, JAI
(Elsevier Science Ltd), Oxford.
Yannopoulou, N., Koronis, E. and Elliott, R. (2010), “Media amplification of a brand crisis
and its affect on brand trust”, Journal of Marketing Management, Vol. 27 Nos 5/6,
pp. 530-546.
Corresponding author
Professor Denis Fischbacher-Smith can be contacted at: denis.fischbacher-smith@glasgow.ac.uk
To purchase reprints of this article please e-mail: reprints@emeraldinsight.com
Or visit our web site for further details: www.emeraldinsight.com/reprints
446
JOEPP
1,4
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
G
LA
SG
O
W
 A
t 0
3:
51
 1
8 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
(P
T)
